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Abstract
Social distinction or status is an important motivation of human behaviour.
This paper provides a selective survey of recent advances in the economic analysis
of the origins and consequences of social status. First, a selection of empirical
research from a variety of scienti￿c disciplines is discussed to underpin the further
theoretical analysis. I then consider the origins and determinants of tastes for
status, discuss the endogenous derivation of such a preferences for relative stand-
ing and assess the di⁄erent formalisations these preferences. Subsequently, the
consequences of preferences for status are studied for a variety of problems and
settings. The last section discusses a number of implications of status concerns
for normative economics and public policy.
1 Introduction
Distinction and status are among the stronger motivations of human behaviour. The
importance of distinction as a fundamental biological dynamic was underlined by Dar-
win (1871), who introduced sexual selection as a second selection mechanism next to
natural selection. To spread across the population, genes of sexual species not only
need to survive in their natural and social environment, but also need to be or appear a
more attractive mating partner than their same sex competitors.1 In sociology, Bour-
dieu (1979) established social distinction as a crucial dynamic of culture and social life.
Distinction was recognised as a powerful motivation for human conduct by the classi-
cal economists, but was increasingly marginalised (as being ￿ sociological￿in nature) as
the formalisation of economic theory proceeded, despite notorious exceptions such as
Rae (1834), Veblen (1899), Pigou (1903) and Duesenberry (1949).2 The development
of game theory, the contemporary importance of consumerist culture, and a range of
empirical anomalies (cfr. infra) have induced a rapid development of the economic
analysis of social status in the past decades. This article provides a selective survey of
the economic analysis of social status and its consequences. The ￿rst section discusses
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1a selection of empirical evidence from various disciplines, motivating the formal models
presented later in this article. The second section shows the endogenous derivation
of status concerns from cooperation between heterogeneous partners with endogenous
partner choice. The third section studies the positive consequences of relative concerns
for real world economic problems and social phenomena. The last section concerns the
implications of status concerns for welfare analysis and economic policy, in the form of
taxation and welfare programs.
2 The Empirics of Social Status
Empirical evidence of the importance of social status comes from sociology and social
psychology, biology, philosophy... In economics, the number of empirical attempts to
trace the importance of status concerns for economic behaviour is more modest, but no
less conclusive.
2.1 Happiness studies
This research was pioneered by Easterlin (1974,1995), who boldly answers the question
whether raising the income of all will raise the happiness of all: ￿It is ￿ no￿" (Easterlin,
1995). Evidence for this statement comes from many national and international hap-
piness comparisons, for which respondents are asked to state their level of happiness
or subjective wellbeing on an index scale. In the post-war United States (until ￿ 80),
one ￿nds no time trend in average happiness in spite of a (constant dollar) increase
of median national family income of 40% (Duncan, 1975). Maddison (1991) con￿rms
these results for the next decades. One ￿nds a similar pattern in 1973-1989 data of
nine European countries, where no happiness trend can be unravelled, in spite of a real
GDP growth of 25% to 50%. In Japan, real per capita income rose to its ￿vefold in the
1958-1987 period but average happiness remained unchanged. As Easterlin (1995) and
Easterlin and Crimmins (1991) note, people￿ s understanding of what is essential for a
￿ good life￿ seems to grow at the same rate as GDP (Gallup, 1977). Finally, Easterlin
(2001) shows that the lack of a trend in happiness is not due to a changing population:
in a cohort analysis of stated happiness no increase in average happiness is noted in
spite of the clear raise of average income throughout the cohort life cycle.
Interestingly, however, a strong correlation between income and stated happiness
can be found in within country comparisons, as investigated by Easterlin (1995, 2001)
for the United States, Oswald (2004) for the European Union, and Frey and Stutzer
(2001) for Switzerland. Within a country, we see that higher income family groups
report on average higher happiness than poorer families. The correlation between stated
happiness and relative income is both relatively strong and very signi￿cant. Evidence
for the relative income hypothesis may also be found on a micro-level. Luttmer (2005)
￿nds that happiness depends negatively on neighbours￿income.
Van Praag and Kapteyn employ a cardinal empirical utility function with a range
between zero and one, named ￿ Individual Welfare Function of Income￿(WFI), to study
the impact of habit formation (￿ preference drift￿ ) and interpersonal comparison (￿ ref-
erence drift￿ ) on the subjective appreciation of income. The WFI is constructed from
repondents￿stated estimates of the net income needed to reach various levels of satis-
2faction. Van Praag, Kapteyn and co-authors use the WFI to test the relative income
hypothesis (e.g. Wansbeek and Kapteyn,1985). Van de Stadt, Kapteyn and van de
Geer (1985) show that utility has an important relative component. Various estima-
tions suggest that own income, reference group mean income and past median income
are important to explain the individual￿ s WFI.
The relativity of utility is also observed for other qualities than income. Powdthaveee
en Oswald (2007) ￿nd that respondents lose on average less happiness from obesity
in an environment with many obese people. Clark (2003) ￿nds that unemployment
diminishes happiness less when general unemployment levels are high. Further results
on the relative nature of stated happiness are surveyed by Clark (2007).
2.2 Stated preferences
Stated preference research puts respondents before a hypothetical choice problem and
asks them to state their preference for the option they believe would maximise their
utility. Solnick and Hemenway (1998) ask their respondents to choose for 12 di⁄erent
goods or characteristics (e.g. income, attractiveness, vacation time) between 2 states:
a ￿ relative case￿A, in which the respondent is worse o⁄in absolute terms (compared to
case B), but better o⁄ than the others and an ￿ absolute case￿B, in which one is better
o⁄ in absolute terms, but worse o⁄ then the others. For example:
￿ A: Your current yearly income is $50,000; others earn $25,000
￿ B: Your current yearly income is $100,000; others earn $200,000
(Prices are what they are currently and are the same in states A and B)
Solnick and Hemenway (1998) ￿nd that for some goods, up to 80% of the respon-
dents prefer the relative case. The number of people choosing option A is highest for
attractiveness and intelligence and lowest for workload and vacation time (still almost
20%), with income in the middle. A similar survey was undertaken by Tversky and Grif-
￿n (1991), who let respondents choose between a job at a magazine A, with own salary
of $35,000 and colleagues paid $38,000 and a magazine B, where one earns $33,000 and
others $30,000. Tversky and Gri¢ n report that 85% of the respondents prefer magazine
A, but that in a second group 64% believe to be happier at magazine B. Note also the
di⁄erence in reference group: Solnick and Hemenway (1998) enclose all others, while
Tversky and Gri¢ n (1991) consider only colleagues. Johansson-Stenman, Carlsson and
Daruvala (2002) let respondents choose between two states for their hypothetical grand-
children and ￿t a constant relative risk aversion utility function through the results.
They also ￿nd that respondents are willing to pay considerably to improve the relative
position of their hypothetical grandchildren. Alpizar, Carlsson and Johansson-Stenman
(2005) use a similar survey to discriminate between di⁄erent functional forms. They
conclude that positionality matters far more for commodities as houses and cars than
for vacation and insurance, but also that both absolute and relative consumption matter
for each category.
32.3 Revealed preferences
Real life revealed preference techniques have the advantage that people have to live the
consequences of their choices, cannot answer strategically and have the opportunity to
learn. Unfortunately, real world behaviour typically ￿ts many alternative interpreta-
tions. To minimize vulnerability to this identi￿cation problem (the ￿ Manski re￿ ection
problem￿ , Manski (1993, 2000)), ingenious setups are required. Revealed preference
work on status therefore trades o⁄ generality and robustness against alternative expla-
nations, although this can be cured partially by more sophisticated data.
George Kosicki (1987) shows how the fact that, contrary to permanent income and
life cycle models, saving rates rise with long run income can easily be rationalized and
well predicted by a simple model with relative concerns. Stark and Taylor (1991) study
international and intranational migration and ￿nd that if absolute income is controlled
for, relative income (within the village) is important in explaining migration decisions.
Glazer and Konrad (1996) argue that charity donations are also motivated by status
motives, (probably) next to altruism. That some donators are also concerned with
status is shown by donation records of institutions that report the names of donators
in donation categories (e.g. $150-500, $501-$1000, 1001-5000, ...). Glazer and Konrad
observe that mean donations within each category are very close to the category lower
bound, as predicted by a theory of donations as signals. Harbaugh (1998) ￿ts a utility
function through similar alumni donation data of law schools. He ￿nds that status
seems an important motivation for charity and that overall donations can be expected to
decrease if not reported at all, and increase if fully reported. Neumark and Postlewaite
(1998) incorporate preference interdependence in a female labour supply model. They
study whether the labour decision of a woman depends on the choices of her sister-
in-law, to avoid spurious regressions due to common social background. Neumark and
Postlewaite ￿nd a positive e⁄ect of employment of the sister-in-law on a woman￿ s labour
decision and that if the sister-in-law is unemployed, a woman is signi￿cantly more likely
to be employed if her husband earns less than her sister-in-law￿ s husband.
2.4 Medical and biological evidence
A range of medical and biological evidence testi￿es that social status induces something
real to happen in both the human and primate brain and body. Long et alii (1982) ￿nd
that test persons show a higher heart rate and blood pressure when confronted with
an experimenter who bears signs of a high status (suit, name tag, formal language).
McGuire et al. investigate the relation between status and the neurotransmitter sero-
tonin (McGuire et al. 1982). High serotonin concentrations are associated with feelings
of happiness, whereas de￿ciencies in the serotonin metabolism are linked to depression,
suicide attempts, mania and sleeping disorders. In groups of vervet monkeys, the dom-
inant animal carries a much (on average 50%) higher concentration of the serotonin in
his blood. By removing the leader, a new substitute leader-monkey sees its serotonin
level rise, and decline again when the old leader is reintroduced (Frank, 1985b). Raleigh
et alii (1986, 1994) found that serotonin also helps individuals to rise in the hierarchy:
monkeys treated with a drug that boosts serotonin levels are signi￿cantly more likely
to climb the hierarchy (Frank, 1999). The same team also found signi￿cant di⁄erences
4in serotonin levels in local human hierarchies, such as college fraternities and athletic
teams (Frank, 1985a). In males, there also exists a relation between status and testos-
terone: reductions in social status are followed by a decrease in plasma testosterone
concentrations and a rise in social hierarchy by an increase. Tennis players show higher
testosterone concentrations after they won a match (Frank, 1999).
Medical studies ￿nd that the wealthier people in society tend to be healthier and
longer lived. Wilkinson (1996) notes that increases in absolute wealth, though initially
important, a⁄ect human health with sharply diminishing returns: once per capita in-
come reaches about $ 5000 a year, additional income gains produce little health gains.
However, within countries relative deprivation and health are correlated. But does
health cause a higher income, or does relative income also a⁄ect health? The ￿rst
causality is obvious, but research also con￿rms the inverse causality. Marmot et al.
(1984,1991) investigate British civil servants, who are all well educated, well paid, have
access to the National Health Service and have a clear local hierarchy. They found
that mortality, after controlling for a range of causal factors, was inversely correlated
with the ranking in the local hierarchy. Another indication comes from a population
of 524 top scientists. Rablen and Oswald (2008) ￿nd that in a population of winners
and nominees of the Science Nobel Prize, and after correcting for a variety of potential
biases, e⁄ectively winning the prize lengthens lifetime on average between one and two
years.
3 Modelling the Struggle for Social Status
Part of the evidence above suggests that we enjoy status for the sake of status itself.
Social status can then be considered an ultimate motive for human action. However,
when applying for a job, o¢ ce or place in a sporting team, it is the relative the rather
than the absolute level of capacities that is decisive. In social life, a general omnipresent
social ranking criterion matters for the allocation of many goods: social status. Weber
(1922) de￿ned ￿ social status￿as: ￿￿ Status￿shall mean an e⁄ective claim to social esteem
in terms of positive or negative privileges￿ . The positions in the socially perceived
ranking in a social group determine the allocation of a range of socially provided goods,
such as (sexual) mates, friends, invitations, partnerships, esteem, sympathy, courtesy,
help etc. (see also: Corneo and Jeanne (1998)). In turn, these mates, partners or friends
often imply material advantages. Marrying a rich counterpart can be an e⁄ective way
of raising disposable income, as historical upper class marriage customs demonstrate.
The provision of several rationed or heterogeneous goods often functions similarly. This
interpretation suggests that preferences should be de￿ned over ordinary commodities
and that a rank dependent social allocation mechanism should be modelled next to the
market.
If there were no interdependence between status and consumption and labour de-
cisions, status could go in the ceteris paribus clause and would only be of limited
importance. However, social status is not independent of consumption or labour deci-
sions and the introduction of social status changes the predictions of economic models
considerably.
53.1 Constraint or preference interdependency?
People care about their relative standing for the sake of status itself and because high
social status implies many material and non-material bene￿ts. How should one then
proceed in modelling the social interdependencies induced by social status? Manski
(2000) distinguishes three categories of interdependencies by which social interactions
can be channelled in the usual microeconomic model: constraint interactions, expecta-
tion interactions and preference interactions.
Constraint interactions include competitive markets: the demand and supply by all
consumers and producers together determine the prices and incomes, and thereby set of
feasible consumption bundles. Expectation interdependencies arise under uncertainty,
when consumers form expectations based on (past) choices of themselves and others
(e.g. statistical discrimination). Preference interactions mean that preference orderings
depend on the choices of others, implying that the behaviour of others becomes a direct
argument of the utility function (e.g. fashion).
Which way should one walk to model social status interdependencies? Part of the
empirical evidence supports the instrumental interpretation of status, indicating a con-
straint interdependency, while the biological and medical evidence suggests that prefer-
ences are the right place to introduce status-interdependencies. Both ways of modelling
are valuable and preferable in some contexts and, yet, there needs not to be a juxta-
position. The instrumental approach is more fundamental and rationalises the direct
preference interpretation as a behavioural or emotional shortcut. Postlewaite (1998)
argues that the preference interdependency and constraint interdependency approach
are equivalent, because some utility functions with status directly as an argument can
be understood as a reduced form formulation of a model in which relative position is
instrumental.
If one chooses to enter the status interdependency directly in the preferences, then
two major options stand out: the Duesenberry formulation and the Frank formulation.











with Ci the consumption of person i and ￿ij the weight attached by person i to the
consumption levels of person j.. This speci￿cation is the oldest and has the advantages
that utility changes continuously in own and other consumers￿consumption and that
one can enter social structure through the reference weights. The major alternative is
the formulation of Frank (1985b),
U (x;y;￿(y))
in which utility increases with the consumption of two goods x and y and with the rank
in the distribution of good y in the population ￿(y), with ￿(:) the distribution func-
tion of consumption of good y in the population. This formulation has the advantage
that it is rationalised by the constraint interdependency approach (cfr. infra), but the
6disadvantage that utility is discontinuous in the consumption of others and for ￿nite
populations also in own consumption. Hopkins and Kornienko (2004b) developed this
speci￿cation further into U (x;y;S(y;￿(y))) with:
S(y) = ￿￿(y) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿(y) + S0; (2)
in which ￿ 2 [0;1[ and S0 2 R+ are constants and ￿￿(y) ￿ lim￿ y!y ￿(￿ y) denotes the
mass of individuals with consumption strictly less than y. This formulation solves the
di¢ culty of ties in Frank￿ s approach. The formulation of Frank (1985) su⁄ers from the
￿ aw that if all consumers buy the same amount of y, they all have the maximal status
and no incentive to increase conspicuous consumption. This is not only counterintuitive,
but it also tends to complicate analysis as it allows for in￿nitely many equilibria. The
parameter ￿ represents the loss in utility from ties and ensures that the utility of being
better than someone is strictly greater than the utility of sharing a rank with this
person. The constant S0 represents the harshness of status competition, as a minimum
status level without any investment in status enhancing goods.
The major alternative to the preference interdependency models, the constraint in-
terdependency approach, is matching models. These models are the most popular way
of rationalising relative concerns since Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite (1992). They can
be understood in the Lancaster-Becker tradition of endogenising marginal utility from
consumption to allow for endogenous changes of the preferences over market commodi-
ties.
3.2 Finding the Right Match
Humanity￿ s superiority as a species stems largely (next to e.g. cognitive capabilities)
from the capacity to exploit the gains of specialisation and cooperation. If no two peo-
ple are the same, choosing the best attainable partner to cooperate with is likely to be a
crucial determinant of success. I restrict my attention on the following pages to the case
in which each consumer can form a partnership with at most one other consumer: one-
to-one matching. The many-to-one matching case produces similar but more extreme
e⁄ects, as the rewards to outcompeting one￿ s peers are higher. Each partner derives
some bene￿ts from cooperation through a jointly produced and shared good. Assume
that the produced surplus is a good, such that the utility functions are increasing in this
argument and that the capacities to produce joint surplus depend on some dimensions
of the consumers￿heterogeneity. Then consumers compete for the best match if partner
choice is free. Let each match be a relation between members of two disjoint sets of con-
sumers (typically male-female, employer-employee, principal-agent...). This is called
￿ two-sided-matching￿ . A two-sided-matching is called ￿ positively assortative￿along some
dimensions if consumers of equal ranking along these dimensions are matched together.
For historic reasons, it is common to use the marriage market as described in Becker￿ s
￿ Theory of Marriage￿(1973) as the generic illustration of two-sided-matching models.
3.3 Basic Settings
Consider two disjoint sets of equal cardinality: a set H = fhg, conveniently called
￿ males￿ , and a set F = ffg of ￿ females￿ , with f;h = 1;:::; N. Let all relevant individual
7quality be captured by a positive real number m. For males, m(h) 2 MH ￿ R+ is
distributed according to ￿H(m) and density function  H (m); and for females m(f) 2
MF ￿ R+ is distributed according to ￿F(m), with density function  F (m). I employ
the shorthand notation m(h) ￿ mh and m(f) ￿ mf. Let f and h to be attributed
from low to high m, such that f < f0 , m(f) < m(f0) and m(h) < m(h0). These
consumers may form a partnership with at most one member of the opposite set, such
that the overall pattern of partnerships is characterised by a matching correspondence.
De￿nition 1 (Matching Correspondence) A matching ￿ is a one-to-one corre-
spondence from H [ F onto itself to the second order (i.e. ￿(￿(h)) = h), such that
￿(h) 2 F [ f?g and ￿(f) 2 H [ f?g:
A ￿ blocking pair￿for a matching ￿ is a pair of man and woman (h;f) 2 H￿F who
are not matched together by ￿; but who mutually prefer to be matched to eachother
above their present match. A matching ￿ is ￿ individually rational￿if no matched male
or female prefers to remain unmatched above their partnership in matching ￿: Using
these pairwise and individual rationality requirements, one may qualify a matching
equilibrium as a core-equilibrium:
De￿nition 2 (Stable Matching) A matching ￿ is ￿ stable￿if it is individually rational
and if it is not blocked by any pair (h;f) 2 H ￿ F:
Gale and Shapley (1962) show that a stable matching always exists in one-to-one
two-sided matching games. Assume for now, without much loss of generality, that all
prefer any partner to remaining unmatched. Their algorithm to ￿nd (and prove the
existence of) a stable matching consists of an iterative procedure in which each man
proposes ￿rst to his most preferred woman. All women who receive proposals keep their
most preferred choice on a string and reject the others. In the next round, the rejected
men propose to their second choice, after which the women again keep their favourite
choice (from the new proposals and the one they kept waiting) and send the rest o⁄.
After at most N2 ￿2N +2 stages, each woman will have received at least one proposal
and the ￿ courtship period￿is over. Each woman accepts the one man she has waiting for
her and a stable matching is implemented. This matching is stable, because if some man
￿say AndrØ ￿prefers another woman to his present wife, then he must have proposed
to her before and she must necessarily have turned him down for a better man, Eric,
who can only have been sent o⁄ for yet an even better man, and so on. Hence, there is
no space for a mutual improvement. The problem is therefore not the existence, but the
abundance of stable matchings. While the procedure above provides the best possible
stable matching for males, indicated by ￿H, Roth and Sotomayor (1990) show that the
procedure in which females propose results in a generally di⁄erent matching pro￿le, ￿F.
The set of stable matchings consists in general of more matchings, with ￿Mand ￿F the
most preferred by respectively males and females.
Assume that all consumers engage in a partnership to produce a joint surplus
￿(mh;mf), which depends only on the levels of characteristics mh and mf in such
a way that ￿(mh;mf) is strictly increasing in both arguments. This joint surplus is
divided among the two partners, in a share qh for male h and a share qf for female
8f; which are both normalised to equal 0 for the share which equals their production
without a partner. The total surplus ￿(mh;mf) is divided among the partners by
bargaining and in accordance to a particular ￿ consumption technology￿ . In the gen-
eral case of non-transferable utility (NTU), the set of feasible divisions of a surplus
￿(mh;mf) is characterised by a possibility frontier ’(:) such that the male partner h
can obtain at most qh = ’(mh;mf;qf) out of a partnership with female f; who gets a
share qf and female f gets at most qf = ’(mh;mf;qh) out of a partnership with a male
h who gets qh; with qh;qf 2 [0;’(mh;mf;0)] and ’0
3(:) < 0: One may distinguish two
interesting special cases of this consumption technology formulation. In the transfer-
able utility (TU) case, the whole surplus ￿(mh;mf) can be divided among the partners
along a linear possibility constraint such that ￿(mh;mf) = qh + qf: Alternatively, in
perfect local public good case the possibility constraint is reduced to a point, such that
￿(mh;mf) = qh = qf.
Except for the perfect local public good, a matching equilibrium requires a speci-
￿cation of the partnerships (a stable matching) and a division of the surpluses among
the partners which supports the stable matching.
De￿nition 3 (Matching Equilibrium) A matching equilibrium speci￿es a matching
correspondence ￿ and a surplus division q￿
h and q￿
f such that









f) for h = ￿(f):
2. the matching ￿ is stable given the surplus division q￿
h and q￿
f: there do not exist
any unmatched h and f and ￿ q > q￿
h such that ’(mh;mf; ￿ q) > q￿
f:
3.4 The baseline case
Can one predict a stable equilibrium of a matching game? Eeckhout (2000) shows
conditions which reduce the set of stable matchings to a singleton f￿￿g. One su¢ cient
and intuitive condition requires all consumers to have the same ranking of potential
partners. If all consumers prefer a partner with higher m above one with lower m; i.e.
8h 2 H : f ￿h f
0 , f > f
0 , mf > mf0
8f 2 F : h ￿f h , h > h
0 , mh > mh0;
with a ￿x b denoting "x prefers a over b", then there exists a unique stable
matching which is positively assortative along mh and mf, such that
N 3 x ￿ N : ￿
￿(x) = x:
But when does this condition apply? In the case of the pure local public good, PAM is
the unique stable matching whenever the surplus ￿(:) is strictly monotonic in quality
m. For transferable utility, conditions for PAM were ￿rst formulated by Becker (1973).
De￿nitive su¢ cient conditions for PAM in the TU case are provided by Legros and
9Newman (2002), and shown by Amir (2005) as a special case of the Topkis (1968) su-
permodularity result. A su¢ cient condition for PAM in the TU case is supermodularity




This can for the discrete case be rewritten as:
8h > h
0;f > f
0 : ￿(mh;mf) ￿ ￿(mh;mf00) ￿ ￿(mh0;mf) ￿ ￿(mh0;mf0);
which means that the incremental output of the better male switching to the better
female exceeds the incremental output of the worse male switching to the better female,
so that the better male can always (weakly) outbid the worse male to persuade the more
attractive female. Legros and Newman (2007) have generalised this condition to the





2 [0;’(mh0;mf0;0)] : (3)
’(mh;mf;’(mh;mf0; ￿ q
f0
)) ￿ ’(mh0;mf;’(mh0;mf0; ￿ q
f0
)):
This condition may be read again as following: ￿x ￿ qf0 at some level as the share
which the worst female receives. Then, at the left hand side ’(mh;mf0; ￿ qf0) denotes
what female f should give male h to make him indi⁄erent between matching f and f0
and hence ’(mh;mf;’(mh;mf0; ￿ qf0)) is what she may maximally get out of a match with
h: Similarly, at the right hand side, ’(mh0;mf0; ￿ qf0) is what makes male h0 indi⁄erent
between matching f and f0 and therefore ’(mh0;mf;’(mh0;mf0; ￿ qf0)) is what she can
maximally get out of a match with h0:
These conditions for PAM are independent of the distribution functions ￿H and ￿F.
The distributions do matter, however, for the size and division of the surplus. PAM










Hopkins (2005) studies the comparative statics of partner quality of a PAM with respect
to the distributions ￿H and ￿F. Figure 1 illustrates PAM in two economies A and B, in
which the distribution of mf is identical but the distribution of male quality mh di⁄ers.
Distribution ￿H
A(m) stochastically dominates distribution ￿H
B(m) and this makes any
male better o⁄in society B: For a quality m male, the partner quality is b in society B
and a in society A.
The females are better o⁄ in economy A compared to economy B. Clearly, the
converse goes for two economies that di⁄er only in the distribution of female qualities.
The distributions ￿H and ￿F also restrict the division of ￿(:): by determining the
surplus of the next best match of each of the partners, the matching process imposes a
lower bound on the acceptable divisions of ￿(:). Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite (2001)
and Felli and Roberts (2002) apply this idea to the labour market and study the extent
to which matching solves (or attenuates) the underinvestment of both parties as a
consequence of the hold-up problem (investments, once acquired, are sunk costs and
can therefore not be used in wage bargaining).
10Figure 1: Positive Assortative Matching and Stochastic Dominance of ￿H
A(m) over
￿H
B(m) (after: Hopkins, 2005).
3.5 Matching along endogenous qualities
In the last paragraph, the utility of each consumer depended by assortative matching
exogenously on her ranking among peers. In reality, the qualities along which match-
ing occurs are mostly manipulable. This can be either because the true qualities are
imperceptible, such that consumers distinguish themselves from lower types by costly
signaling, or because the relevant qualities which determine the joint surplus are ma-
nipulable. In both cases, consumers invest in their observable quality to enhance their
attractiveness as a partner. This implies a strategic investment decision: the returns
to investment depend both on the own investment and on that of the competitors.
As a matter of taxonomy, one may - next to the TU-NTU distinction - distinguish six
broad categories of matching along endogenous qualities games. A ￿rst categorisation
concerns the sexes that signal:
1. Both sexes invest. The relevant matching qualities of both sexes are manipulable
and hence both sexes in￿ ate their attractiveness. This case tends to be analytically
involved: both the costs of achieving a rank (the distribution of qualities of the
own sex) and the returns to achieving that rank (the distribution of quality of the
opposite sex) are endogenous for all consumers.
2. One-sided investments. The matching qualities of only one sex are manipulable.
This is common in biological settings of sexual selection, but these are in fact
mostly many-to-one matching models: since the best male can often perfectly
inseminate all females, there is no incentive for the females to boost attractiveness.
In one-to-one matching models, one-sided signaling is generally only assumed for
analytical convenience.
A second important distinction is the functionality of the investment to partners:
1. Costly signaling: The classical signaling case, inspired by Spence (1974). The
true quality of consumers is invisible to potential partners, and consumers invest
11in a costly signal which is useless to the other sex (no argument of ￿(:)), but
whose marginal costs are higher for worse types. Partners care about signaling
as a reliable indicator of true quality. The signaling consumer may or may not
derive direct utility from signaling.
2. Premarital investment game: The investment variable is the only reason for get-
ting involved in the partnership. No other invisible characteristic matters for the
joint surplus ￿(:).
3. Productive signaling: The hybrid case, in which the signal itself is intrinsically
valuable to the partner, but other exogenous characteristics matter as well. The
surplus depends on a combination of endogenous investments and exogenous qual-
ities.
A last important distinction in the matching along endogenous quality games con-
cerns the size of the population. For very large populations, Peters and Siow (2002) and
Peters (2006, 2007) show that the matching equilibrium bears strong resemblance to
the hedonic pricing equilibrium of Rosen (1974).3 In not so large populations, strategic
interactions may become more intricate and attention is usually limited to particular
symmetric equilibria.
The matching along endogenous qualities game is played in three stages:
1. Investment stage: consumers invest in observable qualities, denoted by I 2 R+.
2. Matching stage: partners of the opposite sexes are matched along the relevant
visible qualities.
3. Division of the surplus.
Consider the one sided signaling matching game with a pure local public good
consumption technology, similar to that of Hopkins (2005). Assume two continua of
consumers of equal measure distributed over the typespaces MH and MF: Assume
￿nally that males are the signaling sex and let (without too much loss of generality)
mh denote income. Female consumers choose a partner to maximise joint surplus.
The male consumer divides income mh on visible investments I and an aggregated rest
consumption good. The prices of both goods are normalised to one. Visible investments
serve the consumer in two ways: they generate utility directly and determine the surplus
from cooperation, as I determines both the partner quality and own productivity. Let
the preference ordering of all males be represented by an identical utility function which
depends on income mh, investments in visible good I and the quality of partner mf:
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mh￿
represent the optimal investments of each type of male. If I(:) is monotonically increas-
ing in mh and ￿ (:) still strictly increases in mh and I; then the equilibrium matching




















































with  H;  F and   the density functions associated with, respectively, ￿H(:); ￿F(:)
and ￿(:): In the fashion of Mailath (1987), one needs to impose a number of regularity
conditions on V (:) to guarantee a unique strictly increasing incentive compatible equi-
librium (with V 0
k(:) and V 00
kj(:); respectively, the ￿rst and second order derivatives to the
k￿th argument and the k-th and j-th argument):
Condition 4 (Smoothness) V (:) is twice continuously di⁄erentiable:
Condition 5 (Partner Monotonicity) V 0






Condition 6 (Type Monotonicity) V 00






Condition 7 (Strict Quasiconcavity) V 0




￿MF;which is denoted Io (the ￿ intrinsic optimum￿ ); where V 00
22(mh;Io;mf) < 0.
Condition 8 (Boundedness) There exist ";k > 0 such that jV 0
2(:)j > k for jI ￿ Ioj >





￿ MF: There exists an " > 0 such that  F (:) > " on MF and a
0 < K < 1 such that  F (:) < K on MH:
Condition 9 (Initial Value) I(mh
1) = Io(mh
1):






@I is strictly monotonically in-
creasing in mh over MH:
Condition 5 encompasses the di⁄erent types of investments and consumption tech-
nologies distinguished above, as it requires only that males prefer ￿ better￿partners over
worse. Condition 6 requires that the marginal utility cost of any level of investment
is decreasing in income, i.e. it is always easier for higher income males to a⁄ord some
level of investment than for lower income males. Condition 7 ensures that all males
would have a unique optimal level of investments I in the absence of matching concerns.
Condition 9 is in fact an optimality condition and requires that the poorest male, who
will in equilibrium be matched with the poorest female anyway, will ￿nd it optimal
to choose the investment he would make in the absence of matching concerns. Since
there are no worse types to outcompete, he does not distort his behaviour because of
matching. Condition 10 is the common single crossing condition for a continuum of
types.
13Under these conditions, it can be shown along the lines of Mailath (1987), that
there is a unique equilibrium investment function I(:), in which all males maximise
their utility and PAM is stable. Moreover, the unique equilibrium investment function
























One intuition for the initial value problem in equation 4, suggested by Mailath
(1987), is to allow all males to choose the male type ^ mh they want to be taken for by













































￿1 (￿H (^ mh))
￿ = 0:
All consumers equate the marginal bene￿ts of investing in I and getting a better partner
(the second term) to the marginal utility costs of I (foregoing other consumption), net
of possible direct utility bene￿ts (both in the ￿rst term). If all consumers try to cheat in
the same way, and if conditions 4 to 10 ensure that this optimum is strictly increasing in




no male wants to deviate. Equation 5 can be rewritten to the di⁄erential equation in
(4).
In equilibrium, all males invest just enough to discourage worse types from aspiring
a better female and all males, but the worst, invest strictly more than what they would
in the absence of matching. How much more depends on the utility function and
the distributions of male and female exogenous qualities. Hopkins (2005) shows that
the highest income males generically invest more if competition among high income
types is ￿ercer (higher density of high types), but that more general statements require
strong assumptions on V (:) and the distribution functions. The comparative statics of
partner quality, as demonstrated in the baseline case, remain of course valid. In the
case of transferable utility the PAM outcome generally restricts the bargaining process
considerably for a continuous typespace. The partners should get a su¢ cient share of
the surplus in order not to prefer a lower partner type.
3.6 Indirect Preferences Revisited
Matching shows how under general conditions of cooperation among heterogeneous con-
sumers with free partner choice, both the absolute and relative qualities of a consumer
determine wellbeing. If the relevant qualities are manipulable, then the marginal utility
of such a quality I depends through ￿(I) on the decisions of all other consumers. This
generates an interpersonal interdependency in the consumer problem, which is not me-
diated by markets. The utility function with relative concerns entered directly in the
14style of Frank (1985b), a preference interdependency, is a reduced form of the consumer
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h;I;￿(I))
If matching along endogenous qualities can be written in the Frank (1985) formu-
lation, why then bother about matching? Postlewaite (1998) assesses the advantages
of the direct (preference interdependence) and indirect (constraint interdependence)
approach in three arguments. First, competition for partners explains why humans,
as other mammals, seem to have hardwired preferences for status. Second, however,
not entering ranking concerns directly has important methodological advantages over
the direct approach. It allows to stick to the standard body of methods and its main
virtues: parsimony and tractability. In line with the Lancaster-Becker paradigm, one
de￿nes stable ￿ deep￿preferences over ￿ basic commodities￿and social processes such as
matching then allow rationalising and endogenising di⁄erences in preferences over mar-
ket commodities. Third, the direct utility approach tends to explain virtually anything
and hence nothing at all, as adding an immaterial variable as status weakens the pre-
dictive and explanatory power by increasing the arbitrariness of models. The indirect
approach constrains the solution considerably and allows to make testable predictions
of how social structure and formal and informal institutions map onto relative concerns
through the matching process. Of course, the indirect approach also has drawbacks.
First, although emotional behavioural shortcuts evolved to solve constraint or infor-
mation interdependency problems, nothing guarantees that they always solve these
optimally, such that an indirect approach may not predict actual behaviour correctly.
Second, entering interdependencies through the constraint is more complicated, such
that preference interdependencies are often preferred for viability. In the remainder
of this article, I therefore often employ the preference interdependency approach as a
reduced model.
4 Status and the Real World: Applications
4.1 Static Applications: A Consumption Bias
Relative concerns create a ￿ relativistic bias￿in consumption choices: they push con-
sumers away from the consumption pattern they would prefer in social isolation. Hirsch
(1976) noted that interpersonal comparison is more important for some goods than for
others. He named commodities as clothing, cars and housing, for which status pres-
sures a⁄ect choices more, ￿ positional goods￿ . ￿ Nonpositional goods￿have a relatively
small social utility component and are typically goods like family time, insurance and
workplace safety... One can easily formalize this relativistic bias in a static two goods
model. Let m denote income, which a consumer can spend on a visible positional good
I at price pI (for ￿ status investment￿ ), for which both absolute consumption and relative
consumption S(I) matters, and ￿ nonpositional￿good c (for ￿ rest consumption￿ ) at price
pc. Social status S(I) is de￿ned as in (2). The consumption problem is:
15Max U(I;c;S(I)) s:t: pII + pcc ￿ m:
















The marginal utility of I consists of two components: intrinsic marginal utility and





@I .4 Relative concerns have traditionally been con-
ceived as a wasteful, welfare reducing pressures. The reason is that status competition
is zero-sum game in ranks, as Hirsch (1976) noted. When a consumer rises one place
in the hierarchy, another necessarily goes down one place. If equilibrium investments
I(m) are strictly increasing in income, then all would achieve the same status by in-
vesting only a fraction of I or if m were visible (and the only relevant variable). The
social marginal utility component of I is a ￿ spurious return￿(Frank, 1985b). However,
investing in I is typically the dominating strategy: if others abstain from investing; one
may gain ranks by investing. And if all others invest; one has to invest to maintain
the present rank. As a consequence, all are trapped in a n-person prisoners￿dilemma.
As Hirsch (1976) puts it: ￿Consumers, taken together, did not get what they ordered.￿
Frank (1985a, 1999) extensively illustrates this ￿ relativistic bias￿for the case of over-
spending in conspicuous goods like cars, private airplanes, housing, exclusive wines and
cigars and other luxury goods and underspending in nonpositional goods like leisure
and family time, saving and insurance. Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite (1995) show
how matching concerns make consumers work too much and enjoy suboptimally little
leisure. Robson (1992) shows excessive risk taking as a consequence of status concerns.
4.2 Dynamic Applications
The ￿ relativistic￿bias quite naturally extends to dynamic consumer problems. When
social or institutional arrangements persistently bias consumption and investment de-
cisions in the same direction, relative concerns can have important consequences for
growth and development. Postlewaite (1998) suggests that matching concerns can be
an essential building block in explicit models of how di⁄erent social arrangements ex-
plain apparent di⁄erences in time preferences and the resulting di⁄erences in growth
and development (see also Futagami and Shibata (1998)). A dynamic growth model
with endogenous matching was the main ingredient of Cole et al. (1992), which initiated
the literature of endogenous relative concerns.
Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite (1992) introduce an in￿nite horizon intergenerational
model, in which generations of males, indexed h, have identical preferences di⁄erent
initial income mh. Each male h cares at time t about his own consumption ch;t and the
wellbeing of his son, which depends on the son￿ s consumption ch;t+1 and the quality of
partner he attracts m(￿(h;t + 1)): Each generation lives for one period t and divides
inherited wealth between consumption ch;t and investment in the family￿ s capital stock
kh;t; by passing on Akh;t as a bequest to the next generation (with kh;0 = mh and
A the growth rate of capital). Consumption choice is therefore constrained by ch;t =






t [U(Akh;t ￿ kh;t+1) + m(￿(h;t))]
s.t. kh;0 = mh and Akh;t ￿ kh;t+1
If the partner matching ￿(h;t) is exogenous, optimal investments k￿
h;t+1 at time t + 1












Matching may again occur along the total consumption, as in the pre-marital invest-
ment game, e.g. Cole et al. (1992), or along some positional good, as in the signaling
game, e.g. Corneo and Jeanne (1998). If matching occurs positively assortative along




























Cole et al. (1992) prove the existence of a symmetric equilibrium in this game and
show that in this equilibrium optimal investments in capital are increasing in initial
wealth mh: More importantly, the fraction of wealth invested in capital is always
weakly higher in the endogenous matching case than with exogenous matching (and
generically strictly higher). Hence, this model suggests that matching arrangements
can induce di⁄erences in capital accumulation among societies. However, the e⁄ects
of status concerns on capital accumulation are generally not as straightforward as this
simple model suggests. Corneo and Jeanne (1998) observe that even the sign of this
bias in saving depends crucially on the timing of the matching stage in the consumers￿
lifetime. If matching concerns matter more during youth than during old age, then
consumers face an extra marginal cost component of saving while young. In fact, the
intergenerational transfers model with altruistic parents is one of the rare cases where
the direction of the status concerns incentives on capital accumulation is beyond doubt.
Cole et alii (1992) then introduce a di⁄erent matching rule, aristocratic matching,
which serves as a self-enforcing institution to reduce the e⁄ects of matching concerns.
Social status e sh, depends in this matching also on the initial wealth ranking. In all
later periods t, sons inherit the status of their fathers if they match a girl of their own
standing, but lose their status e sh = 0 if they deviate from their historical fate: Cole et
alii (1992) disentangle the conditions under which aristocratic matching is sustainable,
i.e. in which the costs of loosing the ancestral status outweigh the gains of marrying
17a richer partner of the ￿ wrong￿lineage. However, low status lineages have little to
loose and hence little incentive to stick to the equilibrium, such that the aristocratic
equilibrium only holds when the distribution of initial wealth is su¢ ciently spread out.
Cole et alii (1998) extend the idea of collective and self-enforcing attribution of status.
The threshold which makes sticking to the aristocratic norm optimal, endogenously
demarcates the border between two di⁄erent social classes, with di⁄erent modes of
conduct. The importance of an underclass lies in the threat of ostracism to higher
classes, so that despite the lack of direct interactions between the classes, the lower
class sustains collective action within the upper class.
Aristocratic matching is a ￿rst example of how an utterly useless attribute can be-
come valuable in a matching process. The only value of aristocratic status lies exactly
in the fact that other consumers value it, again for the same reason. And because
other consumers value it, status enhances the matching prospects of one￿ s o⁄spring
and is therefore worth investing in. Mailath and Postlewaite (2006) develop this idea
further to illustrate how qualities can be valued in a matching context which have no
direct value to either partner and no correlation to intrinsically valuable characteris-
tics. If society values some inheritable characteristic, then this quality is worthwhile
to invest in. Mailath and Postlewaite (2006) allow for both genetic characteristics,
such as hair or skin colour, which are inherited with probability ￿ = 0:5 per parent
with the attribute, and for epigenetic qualities such as accent or sophisticated man-
ners, which can be inherited by socialisation with a probability ￿ 6= 0:5. Mailath
and Postlewaite show an in￿nite horizon endogenous matching process with two-period
lived consumers, divided over disjoint sets of males and females of equal measure. Con-
sumers di⁄er in a binary way in two dimensions, such that the typespace for both sexes
is ￿ = f(mH;Y );(mL;Y );(mH;N);(mL;N)g; with Y and N indicating whether a
consumer has the attribute or not, and mH and mL indicating high and low income.
Assume for simplicity ￿ = 0:5 and that half of the males and females have the attribute.
The attribute is ￿ unproductive￿if consumers with and without the attribute have a high
income with probability 1
2 and ￿ productive￿if consumers with and without the attribute
have a high income with probabilities 1
2 + k and 1
2 ￿ k respectively. In this matching















with males, in the ￿rst column and females, in the second column, of the same row






with ￿ 2 [0;1), such that the discounted value of an in￿nite sequence of constant ￿ ow
utilities ￿ has a discounted value ￿. One may then normalize the ￿ ow utility of a
18match of two high income partners to 1 and of two low income consumers to 0. Remark
that in the PAM equilibrium, a lineage with the heritable attribute keeps it forever.









￿ k, such that the discounted value of the attribute is V A
Y ￿ V A
N = 2k and
hence zero for an unproductive trait. Interestingly, there also exists a stable matching
equilibrium which is mixed in income (the relevant argument) and implies that some
high income lineages without the attribute give up part of their consumption to have a















In this equilibrium, the discounted expected utility of a consumer lineage with the






























with u the ￿ ow utility of a match between a high and low income consumer. The ￿rst
term is the discounted utility of having a high income (with certainty of a high income
match and o⁄spring with the attribute) multiplied by its probability, the second term is
the discounted utility of having a low income (with a mixed match and uncertainty over
the attribute of the o⁄spring) multiplied by its probability. Similarly, the discounted




























The discounted value of the heritable trait may then be seen to equal: V M
Y ￿ V M
N =
(1 + 2k)(1 ￿ ￿)
2 ￿ ￿(1 + 2k)
, which remains positive for unproductive traits (k = 0). Mailath
and Postlewaite (2006) show that the mixed matching pro￿le is stable if and only if
4 ￿ 3￿
4 ￿ 2￿
￿ u, such that investing in useless attributes can only be optimal if the future
is su¢ ciently important compared to the foregone income to acquire the attribute.
Hence, in this equilibrium, high income consumers without the attribute are willing
to forego consumption to improve the matching prospects of their o⁄spring, to whom
the attribute is valuable again because it is valued by others. Mailath and Postlewaite
(2006) also show that a su¢ ciently large increase of income can break the stability of
mixed matching, as this raises the opportunity costs of obtaining the heritable trait, and
they investigate endogenous investments in the cultural transmission of the attribute
as an extension.
Corneo and Jeanne (1998, 1999) investigate the implications of social segmentation
between two classes on status emulation and the accumulation of capital. The extreme
19cases of social segmentation may be a strongly segmented caste system, in which one
meets almost only consumers of the same type and a fully mixed unsegmented society
on the other hand, in which every consumer draws the type of a potential partner with
the same probabilities. Corneo and Jeanne (1999) show that segmentation aggravates
social competition and the relativistic bias in the full information context, as segmen-
tation aggravates competition among likes, but reduces competition and the bias in an
asymmetric information context, as segmentation functions there as a weak substitute
for signaling, decreasing the incentives to distinguish oneself from worse types.
How does the relativistic bias depend on economic inequality? A ￿rst simple answer





 (I) contains the density function  (I): When incomes are more
densely concentrated, one may gain more by marginally increasing status investments
I; such that the resulting relativistic bias is higher. Hopkins and Kornienko (2006)
develop this idea in a setting in which male consumers live for two periods and are
endowed at birth at time t with an income mh, drawn from a distribution ￿H(mh) over
support [m1;mM] ￿ R+ and with mean ￿ ￿. Males spend this income on consumption in
both periods. Only consumption when males are young is visible and determines their
status, modelled as in (2). For simpli￿cation, consumers care only about status when
young and only about consumption when old, such that they maximise
Uh;t = logS (ch;t;￿(ch;t)) + ￿ logch;t+1:
Let kh;trepresent investments in capital; which are constrained by ch;t + kh;t ￿ mh,
ch;t+1 ￿ At (kh;t)
￿ and ch;t;ch;t+1 ￿ 0: Hopkins and Kornienko (2006) show5 that the
optimal of savings or capital, k￿
h;t; in this simple model may be stated as:
k
￿
















If S0 = 0, social competition is cut-throat, with total social exclusion for the worst
male. The almost worst consumer then invests his whole income on status and saves
nothing. Consider then the e⁄ect of inequality via a linear taxation scheme, with
￿ 2 [0;1[ a linear income tax rate of which the revenues are distributed equally among
all consumers, such that post tax income ~ m may be written







The pre tax distribution of incomes is a mean preserving spread of the post tax distri-
bution ￿ ￿H(~ m). Status rankings are una⁄ected by this tax, but incentives to save have






in the tails. If S0 = 0, all but the poorest consumer (who saves zero) save less after
20taxation. If S0 > 0, redistribution makes the consumers below the average better o⁄
in income terms. But as social competition increases directly under the mean, some
consumers get more income after taxes but save less. Hence, after taxes all consumers
with an income above the mean became poorer and save less, the poorest became richer
and save more, but a fraction of the population right under the mean became richer, but
still saves less because of increased social competition. Whether more equality improves
economic growth is, from the viewpoint of status competition, questionable.
5 Welfare and Taxation: Policy
5.1 Welfare analysis
Status competition is essentially a zero sum game, and because of this wasteful and
￿ immoral￿character, status concerns have themselves been a rather popular subject of
welfare assessment. A ￿rst issue is then the choice of a point of reference to compare the
relativistic equilibrium with. A ￿rst candidate is the exogenous assortative matching
case. Since the quality of mate (and hence surplus ￿) is constant, only intrinsic utility
matters in this comparison. Since the relativistic bias is a costly deviation away from
the intrinsic utility maximum, relative concerns generate a welfare loss for all but the
worst consumer. This exogenous status or matching scenario has been the most popular
point of comparison, but is it also the most relevant? In a signaling or matching
framework, the natural alternative to the separating and assortative equilibrium is
a pooling equilibrium with random matching or average status (Rege, 2007). This
comparison considers not only the costs of the relativistic competition, but also potential
e¢ ciency gains of endogenous assortative matching the distributional e⁄ects through
the allocation of partners and status. The lowest quality consumer is always worse o⁄
in the separating or assortative equilibrium than in the pooling one, such that very
inequality averse social planners always prefer the pooling equilibrium.
A second factor in the welfare assessment of relative concerns is the functionality
of investment variable I. As long as I refers to wasteful signaling, the relativistic bias
causes a welfare loss compared to the exogenous matching case. But for the premari-
tal investment game, the intrinsic optimum is actually socially suboptimal, because it
does not take the positive externality of I on the future partner into account. Relative
concerns due to endogenous matching partly compensate this underinvestment. Peters
and Siow (2002) show that a two-sided premarital investment game can, for very large
markets, sometimes fully internalise the externality of I on the partner, although equi-
librium investments tend to overshoot the externality for smaller populations. Peters
(2005) shows for a more general setting that matching concerns typically make con-
sumers over-invest in I, even in large markets. In the Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite
(1992,1998), the higher saving levels due to matching concerns are considered ine¢ -
ciently high, because they are higher than the intrinsic optimum. However, they show,
in fact, a pre-marital investment game, with total consumption a pure local public good,
such that the matching process may help to internalise the externality of saving on the
future partner and therefore correct the ine¢ cient saving of the intrinsic optimum.
In many cases, relativistic preferences are rather the appropriate framework to as-
21sess some other phenomenon. Hopkins and Kornienko (2004b) pioneer in expanding the
traditional evaluation of income distributions to an interdependent preference frame-
work in the style of Frank (1985b). They set out a particular multiplicative utility
function to stress the similarity with ￿rst bid sealed price auctions. Utility is then the
product of intrinsic utility and status:
V (I;c)S(I;￿(I));
with S(I;￿(I)) de￿ned as in (2). The price of the nonpositional good pc is normalised
















For a strictly monotonic equilibrium investment function I(m); the probability of having
a strictly higher status than some random other consumer with income m0; may be




V (I;m ￿ pI)(￿(I
￿1(I) + S0) (7)
which results in the ￿rst order condition:
V
0
1(I;m ￿ pI) ￿ pV
0






in which the third term contains the part of utility which is socially interdependent
through  (m) and ￿(m). The optimal solution is again characterized by an initial
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= p. One problem with
multiplicative utility is that if S0 = 0; the worst consumer always has zero utility,
such that his optimal consumption remains undetermined. The initial value problem
in (8) uniquely determines the optimal choice of all other consumers (under conditions
similar to conditions 4 to 10) and all but the worst consumer invest strictly more than
in the intrinsic optimum. Hopkins and Kornienko (2004b) consider the welfare e⁄ects
of a shift in the income distribution for consumers who remain at a constant income
level: Such a change in the income distribution a⁄ects the utility of consumers with
￿xed incomes in two ways: by decreasing their status S(:) and by changing the optimal
levels of investment in I.
Hopkins and Kornienko (2004b) show that if income distribution ￿A second order
Lorenz dominates distribution ￿B and both distributions cross a limited number of
times with ￿rst crossing at e a, then all consumers with income smaller than e a are better
22o⁄ in distribution ￿B. More equality decreases the status of the poor whose income
remains constant and their optimal level of I either increases or decreases. Note that
even if the poor consume their intrinsic optimum, they are still worse o⁄ in the dom-
inating distribution because of the lower status. In the case of ￿rst order stochastic
dominance, all consumers (at constant income) are worse o⁄in the dominating distrib-
ution. A higher minimal status level S0 has an appeasing e⁄ect on social competition,
such that the optimal level of status investments I decreases:
To obtain stronger welfare results, Hopkins and Kornienko (2004b) employ a ratio
re￿nement of second order stochastic dominance: unimodal likelihood ratio ordering.
Two distributions ￿A and ￿B satisfy Unimodal Likelihood Ratio ordering (denoted ￿A











is strictly increasing for all m < ￿ m and
strictly decreasing for m > ￿ m. If ￿A ￿ULR ￿B, then Hopkins and Kornienko (2004b)
show that the ratio
S0 + ￿A(m)
S0 + ￿B(m)
has at most two extremal points, a minimum m
￿ and a
maximum m
+; and one point ~ m where the ratio equals 1 (the unique crossing of ￿A(m)
and ￿B(m)); which are such that m1 ￿ m
￿ < ~ m < m
+: If S0 = 0, status investments
are strictly higher for all consumers with (constant) income lower than m
+in the ULR
dominating distribution and possibly for higher incomes too. If S0 > 0, then status
investments are lower in the dominating distribution for consumers with income lower
than m
￿; higher after some income level in the interval ]m
￿; ~ m] and possibly again
lower after an income level higher than m
+.
The focus of Hopkins and Kornienko (2004b) on the welfare e⁄ects at a ￿xed income
levels is fairly limiting. Hopkins and Kornienko (2004a) allow for changes in the income
of all individuals (and hence the support of the income distribution). These income
changes are limited to a linear income tax of which the revenues are divided equally.
This implies that the pre tax income distribution is a mean preserving spread of the
post tax distribution. It also means that income rankings are kept constant, while
incomes and the distribution of incomes change. The poor all have a higher income
now, but may or may not be worse o⁄because of increased social competition, whereas
the welfare e⁄ect of the tax on the rich is clearly negative. Despite having a higher
income, the increase in social competition incited by the denser income distribution
also obliges these consumers to spend more on status investments, such that they may
after all have less income left to spend on consumption they intrinsically enjoy. Hopkins
and Kornienko (2004a) claim that this ambiguous relation between equality and welfare
may explain some of the empirical di¢ culties in establishing the correlation between
equality and happiness, which traditional theory would expect positive. Earlier work
by Corneo and Gr￿ner (2000) develops this idea further to explain why middle class
median voters may vote against redistribution, even if they would materially bene￿t
from it.
235.2 Optimal Taxation & redistribution
Status investments impose a negative externality with zero sum game characteristics
on other consumers. The case for welfare improving policy and taxation is therefore
clear. A number of early papers noted that status concerns call for higher taxation
on income or luxury commodities. Boskin and Sheshinski (1978) show a model in
which utility depends negatively on the population￿ s mean consumption, calculate the
optimal income tax and show that this tax is higher for interdependent preferences.
Oswald (1983) computes an optimal non-linear tax rule for interdependent preferences
and shows that the results deviate substantially from the traditional results.
The externalities related to status consumption suggest Pigovian corrective taxes,
which may implement the intrinsic optimum. A classical linear Pigovian tax on status
consumption, raising private costs to the full social cost and thus implementing the
intrinsic optimum, is investigated by e.g. Seidman (1988). If the tax authority has
perfect discriminatory abilities, optimal Pigovian taxes will generally be nonlinear, e.g.
because marginal social bene￿ts of status consumption vary with its local density in
the overall distribution. Denoting the optimal tax as a function of income by ￿(m);
p￿ ￿ pI (1 + ￿(m)) and normalising the price of rest consumption to 1, Hopkins and
Kornienko (2004b) try to ￿nd an income tax scheme which implements the intrinsic
optimum. The problem of an income m consumer is
max
I
V (I;m ￿ p￿I)S(I;￿(I));
with S(:) again as in (2). Proceeding as in (7), one ￿nds the ￿rst order condition
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Hopkins and Kornienko (2004b) seek a nonlinear tax scheme ￿(m) which implements





















such that the tax scheme can be written
￿(m) =








which has a unique continuous solution under similar conditions as imposed on the
initial value problem in equation 4. Hopkins and Kornienko (2004b) show that for two
distributions of which ￿A ￿ULR ￿B and with m
￿ and m
+ de￿ned as in the last section,
then ￿A(m) < ￿B(m) on ]m1;m
￿[, ￿A(m) > ￿B(m) on ]m
￿;m
+[ and ￿A(m) < ￿B(m)
24in the interval ]m
+;mM[ (with ￿A obviously indicating the optimal tax scheme for ￿A
and ￿B for ￿B). This result states that Pigovian taxes should higher where the social
competition is higher, which is near the mode of the distribution.
Relative concerns may also explain factual redistribution. Corneo (2002) attempts
to explain why income taxation tends to be highly redistributive in countries where the
pre-tax income is already quite egalitarian. Corneo suggests that in the case of relative
concerns, a redistributive tax improves the allocation e¢ ciency of resources more in
an economy with a more egalitarian pre-tax distribution of incomes, since the status
externality distorts more in more equal income distributions. Corneo (2002) uses as
utility function
logch + ￿1 loglh + ￿2 log(￿(mh));
with ch consumption, lh leisure time, ￿(mh) the distribution function of pre-tax income
mh of consumer h and ￿1 and ￿2 constants. Leisure is speci￿ed as lh = ￿ Lh￿Lh, with ￿ Lh
total time endowment and Lh the labour supply of consumer h, such that mh = wLh.
Tax schemes ￿(m) may be described by mh ￿ ￿(mh) = ￿(mh)
& ; with & and ￿ positive
scalars. The parameter & represents the elasticity of post-tax income with respect to pre-
tax income and is called the residual progression. A tax schedule is called progressive
if & < 1 and regressive if & > 1. A smaller & indicates a more progressive tax schedule.








Corneo (2002) shows that only if the Gini coe¢ cient of the pre-tax income distribution
is smaller than some threshold, introducing a small progressive income tax is a Pareto
improvement. Secondly, it is shown that the tax schedule that implements the undis-
torted labour allocation is progressive, and that this degree of progressivity decreases
with the Gini coe¢ cient of the pre-tax income distribution.
These results on Pareto improving income taxation relate closely to work by Ireland
on status signaling and taxation. Ireland (1994, 1998, 2001) understands status as an
absolute rather than a relative phenomenon, de￿ning status as the spectators￿estimate
of the total consumption (or utility) of a consumer. Utility is taken to depend on
intrinsic utility u(I;c) from status investments I and rest consumption c and on social
status S. Status S is understood as the spectators￿inference about the utility level of
a consumer, b u(I;c). As c is not observable by assumption, b u(I;c) is an estimate of u(:)
based on visible good I. In practice c is substituted by an estimate of c from I; denoted
by d(I), such that the social status part in Ireland￿ s (1994, 1998, 2001) speci￿cation
becomes S = b u(I;d(I)). The budget constraint is again c + pI ￿ m, with 1 and p the
prices of rest consumption and status investments. Ireland (1994, 1998) models utility




U = (1 ￿ ￿)(u(I;mi ￿ pI) + ￿b u(I;d(I));
25with constant ￿ 2 [0;1[ the relative importance of status. Ireland solves this problem
following Mailath (1987a), deriving the familiar di⁄erential equation and no distortion
at the bottom condition (as in e.g. (4)). Equilibrium consumption is biased towards
conspicuous consumption good I, as consumers try to in￿ ate public appearance. But
since all predictably in￿ ate their visible consumption, public inference will in equi-
librium be correct. Ireland (1994) solves this general model for quasi-linear utility
u(I;c) = I + log(1 + c), such that the consumer￿ s problem becomes:
max
I
U = (1 ￿ ￿)[I + log(1 + m ￿ pI)] + ￿[I + log(1 + d(I))];
while assuming that p > 1, such that consumers never consume only I in the absence
of status e⁄ects. In the independent preferences case ￿ = 0, all consume their intrinsic
optimum c = minf(p ￿ 1);mg and I = max
￿




. If ￿ > 0 and incomes
are invisible, one easily derives6 the familiar di⁄erential equation from the ￿rst order















+ ((1 ￿ ￿)p ￿ 1);
with D a constant of integration. If m1 ￿ p ￿ 1 (so that the poorest invests I =
0 in the intrinsic optimum), then the poorest consumer with income m1 gets utility
log(1+m1) without signaling. The second worst buys just enough of I to make imitation
unpro￿table for the poorest. After solving for D; one obtains






+ ((1 ￿ ￿)p ￿ 1); (9)
which also characterises equilibrium expenditures on I.
Within this framework, Ireland studies the possibility of a Pareto improving income
tax and two other transfer policies. An income tax may in this framework increase
welfare rather than impose a burden, by o⁄setting the status driven incentives to over-
work. Ireland (1998) investigates under which circumstances an income tax may be a
Pareto improvement and ￿nds that income taxation can only bene￿t all as long as the
range of pre-tax income is not too great.
Ireland (1994) also studies optimal transfers in the same framework. A ￿rst transfer
policy is a uniform in-kind support of rest consumption; denoted c; to all consumers.
Does it matter whether this support is in-kind or cash, i.e. whether c can be exchanged
for good I or not? If m1 +c < p(1￿￿)￿1 (the intercept in equation 9), all consumers
spend at least m1 + c on c anyway, so whether the transfer is in-kind or cash does not
matter. It does shift the income distribution, however, as m1+c rather than m1 is now
the lowest income, and this makes the path of I slightly steeper. All consume more c;
26but this di⁄erence is less for higher incomes. If however m1+c > p(1￿￿)￿1, then non-
exchangeable transfers may constrain the choice of some consumers if c > p(1￿￿)￿1:
Otherwise, cash or in-kind makes no di⁄erence.
Another option are services to the poor only with optional take up. Give consumers
with an income under m
ﬂ





-m). Take-up should then be complete, if it goes unnoticed. But when take-
up becomes public knowledge, everyone knows the true income of a consumer after take
up: m
ﬂ
. As such, spectators infer their type as the average of those who take up the
welfare bene￿t, denoted ￿(m
ﬂ
). In this case, there is an interval of consumers who are
entitled to the bene￿ts but prefer not to take these up. This interval [b m;m
ﬂ
], where b m
is the critical type who is indi⁄erent between taking up the welfare bene￿t and being
treated as the average ￿ poor￿ , and alternatively not taking up and having as status
higher than ￿(m
ﬂ
). This interval increases as the importance of status increases. Take
up is never 100%, as an upper part of the interval of intended poor prefer to live poorer,
but seem richer. The stigma which keeps many poor from claiming the welfare bene￿ts
they are entitled to get, a phenomenon of considerable empirical importance, is thus
understood as a fear of being pooled with worse types.
6 Conclusions
Although considerable progress has been made in the past decades, the economics of
status still remains for a large part terra incognita. Empirically, the relevance and
importance of status for economic theory has been well established, but the actual
functioning of status is still largely unknown. Better data, experimental research and a
further integration of the human sciences will most likely reveal more. As for the theo-
retical understanding of the economics of status, many issues are unsolved. I mention
some. First, the common status dependent utility function formulations of Duesenberry
(1949) and Frank (1985b) capture only a fraction of the complexity and dynamics of
relativistic preferences. Second, only the relatively simple cases have been solved in
the matching literature, and a lot is to be discovered about multidimensional match-
ing, many-to-many matching and matching along endogenous qualities. Developments
in these will certainly trigger new insights in known applications of social status in
economic theory. Third, contemporary consumerist culture is so rich and complex
that many interesting new applications are impatiently waiting to be studied. Fourth,
the implications of status emulation for welfare analysis are another poorly understood
topic. And ￿nally, the interaction between preferences for conformity and distinction
are still almost uninvestigated and only by combining both dynamics the richness of
the real world will be revealed.
Notes
1See Miller (2000) and Cronin (1993) for excellent surveys on sexual selection theories.
2See Mason (1998) for a survey of the history of the economic analysis of status concerns.
3Peters (2005) shows under which conditions the premarital investment game, played as a bilateral
matching game with endogenous qualities of buyers and sellers, converges to the hedonic pricing
equilibrium. The premarital investment game may thus provide a non-cooperative foundation for
the hedonic pricing equilibrium.
274Note that for smooth distributions,
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+ ￿ log(At (mh ￿ ch;t)
￿);





















￿At (mh ￿ ch;t)
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h;t (ch;t) = mh; such that this ￿rst order condition de￿nes together with initial condition c1;t (m1) =





(mh ￿ ch;t (mh))
￿￿
c1;t (m1) = 0
The di⁄erential equation may be written
(S0 + ￿(mh))
1
￿￿ ￿1   (mh)mh
￿￿
= c0
h;t (mh)(S0 + ￿(mh))
1
￿￿ + (S0 + ￿(mh))
1
￿￿ ￿1   (mh)ch;t (mh)
￿￿
This di⁄erential equation is a well-known problem in the theory of ￿rst price auctions (see e.g.
Jehle and Reny, 2001, pp. 376-377). Integrating both sides and using the intial condition, one obtains
the equation above.
6From the ￿rst order condition
1 ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)p







and using that in equilibrium m = pI + d(I):
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